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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 09-4596 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
RICHARD LEITENBERGER, Appellant 
 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Crim. No. 1-09-cr-00261-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
_____________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 21, 2011 
 
BEFORE:  FUENTES, SMITH and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: March 31, 2011) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant Richard Leitenberger pleaded guilty to 
possessing child pornography and was sentenced to 78 months imprisonment, five years 
of supervised release, a $100 special assessment, and enrollment in the sex offender 
registry.  He appeals his sentence.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.   
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I.  
 We write only for the parties and therefore discuss only the facts necessary to 
explain our decision.   
In their Plea Agreement, Leitenberger and the Government stipulated that 
Leitenberger's base offense level for his crime under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines was 18.  They further stipulated that  Leitenberger should receive a two-level 
enhancement because the material he possessed involved pre-pubescent minors, a four-
level enhancement because the material depicted sadistic conduct and other depictions of 
violence, a two-level enhancement for the use of a computer, a two-level enhancement 
because the offense involved at least 10 but fewer than 150 images of child pornography, 
and a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.  Calculated using these 
stipulations, Leitenberger's total offense level was 25 and his criminal history category 
was I, which corresponded to an advisory sentencing range of 57 to 71 months. 
 The Probation Office calculated differently.  Its Pre-Sentence Investigation Report 
("PSR") rejected the stipulation as to the number of images and found that Leitenberger 
possessed 675 images because his offense involved the purchase of nine videos, which 
are equal to 75 images each according to Application Note 4(B)(ii) for § 2G2.2(b)(7) of 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines.  Accordingly, it applied all the enhancements of 
the Plea Agreement, plus a five-level enhancement for the number of images.  Its total 
offense level equaled 28, which corresponded to an advisory sentencing range of 78 to 97 
months.  
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 At the sentencing hearing, the District Court agreed with the PSR's proposed 
sentencing calculation.  It then went on to apply the statutory sentencing factors set forth 
at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in order to determine whether it should vary from the Guidelines 
in Leitenberger's case.  The District Court observed that Leitenberger had no criminal 
history, that he supported his family through good employment, and that there was 
evidence that he was depressed.   The District Court further noted that Leitenberger had 
been taken advantage of by his father and brother.  With regards to the specific nature of 
his offense, the District Court pointed out that Leitenberger had an interest in child 
pornography going back to 2004.  After being solicited to buy child pornography from an 
undercover agent, Leitenberger exchanged several e-mails with that agent in which he 
explicitly asked for videos of underage girls.  After recounting these facts, the District 
Court took into account the seriousness of the offense, the need to promote respect for the 
law, and the need to provide just punishment for the offense.  The District Court then 
explained that Congress has chosen to attack child pornography at the retail level by 
making it a serious crime.  Turning to the deterrent effect of Leitenberger's prosecution, 
the District Court was uncertain about its specific effect on Leitenberger, but sanguine 
about its general effects on others who might otherwise commit the crime.  Finally, the 
District Court remarked that the issue of unwarranted sentencing disparities was not 
present in Leitenberger's case.  For all of these reasons, the District Court declined to 
vary from the advisory guidelines sentences and imposed a sentence at the bottom of the 
advisory Guidelines range that included 78 months of imprisonment.   
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II. 
A. 
 Leitenberger filed a timely appeal.  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction over Leitenberger's challenge to his sentence under 
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
 Our review of whether a district court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence 
upon a criminal defendant is twofold.  We first consider whether the sentencing court 
committed any procedural errors “such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) 
the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 
3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to 
adequately explain the chosen sentence-including an explanation for any deviation from 
the Guidelines range.”  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en 
banc) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).  If the district court 
committed no procedural error, we consider the sentence's substantive reasonableness.  A 
sentence is substantively unreasonable only if “no reasonable sentencing court would 
have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district 
court provided.” Id. at 568. 
B.  
 Leitenberger makes two arguments on appeal.  First he argues that it was improper 
to reject the stipulation in the Plea Agreement as to the number of images, while 
simultaneously accepting that agreement's stipulations on the use of a computer and the 
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masochistic nature of the images.  Second, he says that the District Court failed to 
thoroughly consider the §3553(a) factors. We find each of these arguments unpersuasive. 
 The District Court was perfectly free to accept some stipulations while rejecting 
others because a plea agreement is an agreement between the defendant and the 
government prosecutor, not between the defendant and the court.  See United States v. 
Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1361 (3d Cir. 1989) (declaring that there must be fairness 
in plea agreements and observing that such agreements are "between an accused and a 
prosecutor.").  As such, a district court is not bound by the parties' stipulations. United 
States v. Ketcham, 80 F.3d 789, 792 n.6 (3d Cir. 1996) ("A sentencing court is not bound 
by factual stipulations in a plea agreement and has discretion to make factual findings 
based on relevant information.").  Indeed, this basic tenet of sentencing was made clear to 
Leitenberger in the plea agreement, App. AA9 ("This agreement to stipulate . . . cannot 
and does not bind the sentencing judge"), and at his plea hearing, App. AA25 (noting that 
Leitenberger responded "Yes, I do sir" to the question "Now, I know there's a stipulation, 
an agreement about this.  But you need to understand that that's not binding on the court.  
Do you understand that?").  The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it found 
that Leitenberger possessed 675 images and used that fact as part of its sentencing 
calculation.1
                                              
1 Leitenberger also argues for the first time on appeal that the enhancement for the 
number of images violates Constitutional principles underlying the separation of powers 
between our three branches of government.   The District Court did not commit clear 
error when it failed to address this argument without being prompted to do so by either of 
the parties.  See United States v. Lopez-Reyes, 589 F.3d 667, 671 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(observing that District Courts are not required to independently scrutinize the policy and 
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 Nor did it abuse its discretion when it accepted the stipulations that Leitenberger 
used a computer to commit his crime and that the images he possessed depicted 
sadomasochism or violence.  Leitenberger admitted each of these things under oath and 
cannot now argue that it was clear error for the District Court to find that each was 
present.  See United States v. Williams, 510 F.3d 416, 422 (3d Cir. 2007) ("When a 
defendant stipulates to a point in a plea agreement, he is not in a position to make . . . 
arguments [to the contrary].") (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 Finally, despite Leitenberger's arguments to the contrary, the District Court gave 
meaningful consideration to the appropriate factors under § 3553(a) and concluded that 
none of them supported a downward variance.  See United States v. Sevilla, 541 F.3d 226, 
232 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that courts must give meaningful consideration to the § 
3553(a) factors).  The District Court's explanation of his chosen sentence allows for 
meaningful appellate review and, after carefully considering that explanation, we see no 
abuse of discretion. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the District Court's sentence is within 
the proper bounds of its discretion.  We will affirm the judgment.  
                                                                                                                                                  
history of a Guideline when there is no disagreement about the Guideline among the 
parties). 
